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COVID-19	and	Computation	for	Policy	
	
by	Jeffrey	Johnson,	Peter	Denning,	Kemal	Delic,	and	Jane	Bromley	
	
 
Editor’s Introduction 
Governments across the world are formulating and implementing medical, social, economic and 
other policies to manage the COVID-19 pandemic and protect their citizens. Many governments 
claim that their policies follow the best available scientific advice. Much of that advice comes 
from computational modeling. Two of the main types of model are presented: the SIR 
(Susceptible, Infected, Recovered) model developed by Kermack and McKendrick in the 1920s 
and the more recent Agent Based Models. The SIR model gives a good intuition of how 
epidemics spread; including how mass vaccination can contain them. It is less useful than Agent 
Based Modeling for investigating the effects of policies such as social distancing, self-isolation, 
wearing facemasks, and test-trace-isolate.  
Politicians and the public have been perplexed to observe the lack of consensus in the scientific 
community and there being no single ‘best science’ to follow. The outcome of computational 
models depends on the assumptions made and the data used. Different assumptions will lead to 
different computational outcomes, especially when the available data are so poor. This leads 
some commentators to argue that the models are wrong and dangerous. Some may be, but 
computational modeling is one of the few ways available to explore and try to understand the 
space of possible futures. This lack of certainty means that computational modeling must be seen 
as just one of many inputs into the political decision making process. Politicians must balance 
all the competing inputs and make timely decisions based on their conclusions—be they right or 
wrong. In the same way that democracy is the least worst form of government, computational 
modeling may be the least worst way of trying to understand the future for policy making. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ubiquity,	an	ACM	publication	
	 October	2020	
	 	
	 	
http://ubiquity.acm.org	 2	 ©2020	Association	for	Computing	Machinery	
COVID-19	and	Computation	for	Policy	
	
by	Jeffrey	Johnson,	Peter	Denning,	Kemal	Delic,	and	Jane	Bromley	
 
	
Worldwide	the	COVID-19	pandemic	has	been	one	of	the	greatest	medical,	social,	economic,	and	
political	shocks	the	world	has	experienced	since	the	Second	World	War.	Economies	around	the	
world	 are	 reeling	 and	 taking	 on	 unprecedented	 levels	 of	 debt	 as	 they	 to	 try	 to	 survive	 the	
pandemic.	Worldwide,	governments	are	adopting	policies,	which	they	say,	“follow	the	science.”	
That	 science	 includes	 traditional	 sciences	 such	 as	 biology,	 medicine,	 and	 epidemiology	
combined	 with	 the	 approach	 of	 complex	 systems	 science	 and	 computational	 modeling.	 We	
explain	this	new	computer	enabled	science	and	how	it	is	used	to	create	computational	models	
that	enable	policy	makers	to	forecast	possible	futures	and	possible	outcomes	of	policy	as	they	
try	 to	 manage	 this	 multi-trillion	 dollar	 global	 catastrophe.	 We	 also	 examine	 some	 of	 the	
controversies	associated	with	modeling	and	policy.	
	
	
The	Emergence	of	a	Deadly	New	Virus	
	
In	the	autumn	of	2019	a	new	virus	appeared	in	China.	The	world	watched	on	as	the	epidemic	
spread	 alarmingly	 through	 the	 eleven	million	 people	 of	 the	 city	 of	Wuhan	 in	 Central	 China’s	
Hubei	province.	China’s	new	“flu”	seemed	far	away	in	December	2019.	Most	countries	around	
the	world	did	not	see	the	significance	of	this	until	January	2020	and	even	then	the	scale	of	the	
threat	was	not	 fully	appreciated	until	 two	months	 later.	 Some	countries	were	 following	 their	
experience	with	 SARS	 and	 Ebola,	where	 local	 containment	 had	 proved	 successful.	 COVID	did	
not	 follow	 the	 same	pattern,	 taking	 everyone	by	 surprise.	 For	 example,	 on	 January	 24,	 2020	
Public	Health	England	 said	 the	 risk	was	 low;	by	 January	31st	 this	was	 raised	 to	 the	 risk	being	
medium;	by	the	4th	of	March	the	British	government	issued	instructions	on	hand	washing	and	
social	 distancing	 by	 two	 meters	 in	 public	 places;	 and	 by	 March	 26th	 it	 declared	 a	 hugely	
expensive	national	lockdown	policy	in	response	to	research	from	Imperial	College	London	[1].	
	
The	 spread	 of	 a	 new	 coronavirus,	 designated	 COVID-19	 by	 the	 World	 Health	 Organization	
(WHO),	was	declared	on	March	11,	 2020	 to	be	 a	pandemic:	 “Pandemic	 is	 not	 a	word	 to	use	
lightly	or	 carelessly.	 It	 is	 a	word	 that,	 if	misused,	 can	 cause	unreasonable	 fear,	 or	unjustified	
acceptance	 that	 the	 fight	 is	over,	 leading	 to	unnecessary	suffering	and	death.	This	 is	 the	 first	
pandemic	 caused	 by	 a	 coronavirus	 and	we	 have	 never	 before	 seen	 a	 pandemic	 that	 can	 be	
controlled	…	we	have	called	every	day	for	countries	to	take	urgent	and	aggressive	action.	…	We	
have	 rung	 the	alarm	bell	 loud	and	clear.”	 [2].	 “COVID-19	 is	 transmitted	primarily	by	particles	
that	 can	 travel	 two	 meters	 or	 more	 when	 an	 infected	 person	 coughs	 or	 sneezes	 and	
contamination	of	hard	surface	where	the	virus	can	survive	for	a	 few	hours”	[3].	The	 infection	
transmission	 depends	 on	 number	 of	 viral	 particles	 multiplied	 by	 time	 of	 contact.	 Passing	
Ubiquity,	an	ACM	publication	
	 October	2020	
	 	
	 	
http://ubiquity.acm.org	 3	 ©2020	Association	for	Computing	Machinery	
someone	 wearing	 a	 mask	 in	 a	 socially	 distanced	 store	 in	 a	 few	 seconds	 is	 less	 risky	 than	
socializing	 in	 a	 noisy	 crowded	 pub.	 Frontline	 workers	 in	 the	 health	 system	 are	 particularly	
vulnerable.	 In	Europe	the	most	severe	early	cases	of	the	pandemic	occurred	in	Northern	Italy	
where	 the	 health	 system	 was	 overwhelmed	 with	 severely	 ill	 people	 who	 could	 not	 all	 be	
treated	in	hospital	[4].	
	
COVID-19	is	a	new	virus	and	in	January	2020	almost	nothing	was	known	about	it.	In	the	months	
that	 followed	policy	makers	were	 faced	with	 the	completely	new	problem	of	estimating	how	
many	 people	would	 be	 infected,	 how	 fast	 the	 virus	would	 spread,	 how	many	 acute	 hospital	
beds	would	be	 required,	how	much	PPE	 (personal	protective	equipment)	would	be	 required,	
how	many	 testing	kits	would	be	 required,	and	so	on.	To	answer	 these	urgent	questions	 they	
turned	to	their	scientists	and	computational	modelers.	
	
	
Policy	Following	the	Science	
	
In	the	early	days	of	the	pandemic	politicians	in	many	countries	repeatedly	said	that	they	were	
“following	the	science.”	For	example,	on	March	11,	2020	the	U.K.	Minister	of	Health	said	in	the	
House	of	Commons,“Our	approach	will	be	guided	by	the	best	scientific	evidence	and	medical	
advice,	and	we	will	take	all	necessary	measures	to	deal	with	this	outbreak”	[5].	Most	countries	
have	scientific	laboratories	and	university	departments	with	expert	knowledge	on	epidemics.	In	
the	 U.K.	 the	 government	 appeals	 to	 its	 Scientific	 Advisory	 Group	 for	 Emergencies	 (SAGE)	 to	
advise	it	on	COVID-19.	However	what	appears	to	be	a	sensible	partnership	between	objective	
scientists	sharing	scientific	 facts	and	politicians	deciding	the	best	course	of	action	 ignores	the	
essential	 nature	 of	 scientific	 knowledge	 as	 contingent	 and	 contested.	 As	 time	 went	 by	 it	
became	clear	there	were	disagreements	on	the	science	between	members	of	SAGE	and	other	
scientists,	 and	even	 scientific	disagreements	within	SAGE.	 In	May	2020	a	 former	government	
chief	scientific	advisor	set	up	an	“alternative	SAGE”	[6].	As	it	became	clear	that	there	was	not	a	
single	definitive	science	to	follow,	political	decisions	had	to	be	made	which,	if	they	went	wrong,	
could	not	be	blamed	on	“the	science.”	It	is	the	nature	of	science	that	its	progress	depends	on	
fierce	battles	between	alternative	theories	and	viewpoints.	Although	there	 is	great	consensus	
across	vast	 swathes	of	 science,	 the	 scientific	 community	 rarely	has	a	 single	view	on	anything	
new.	
	
	
Lockdown	
	
Sooner	 or	 later	 governments	 worldwide	 imposed	 different	 variants	 of	 “lockdown”	 requiring	
people	to	stay	at	home	isolating	themselves,	with	most	business	closed	and	many	people	being	
“furloughed.”	 In	 the	U.K.	 this	meant	 people	 receiving	 a	 reduced	 government-funded	 income	
from	 their	 employer	 instead	of	 being	 let	 go	 so	 that	 the	 business	 could	 start	 again	when	 the	
epidemic	was	over.	 Even	 so	many	people	were	 laid	off	 and	many	 furloughed	people	will	 still	
lose	their	jobs	as	businesses	adjust	to	the	new	economic	situation	after	lockdown.	For	example	
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on	 July	 1st	 12,000	 U.K.	 job	 losses	 were	 announced	 including	 many	 from	 iconic	 department	
stores	such	John	Lewis	and	Harrods	[7].	In	Britain	the	government	has	committed	a	budget	of	
billions	of	pounds	 to	keep	 the	economy	on	 life	 support	until	 it	has	 recovered.	The	social	and	
economic	 cost	 of	 lockdown	 is	 enormous.	 Also	 lockdown	 has	 increased	 the	 number	 of	 non-
COVID	deaths	including	untreated	cancers	and	suicides.	
	
	
Policy	Needs	Forecasts	of	the	Future	
	
Policy	makers	need	to	know	what	might	happen	next,	and	what	will	be	the	likely	outcomes	of	
their	policies.	The	conventional	scientific	approach	cannot	answer	these	questions.	Pandemics	
are	 complex,	 highly	 dynamic	 multilevel	 systems.	 They	 do	 not	 respect	 traditional	 discipline	
boundaries	 between	 the	 biological,	 medical,	 social,	 economic,	 and	 other	 sciences.	 Global	
spread	 and	 infection	 numbers	 emerge	 at	 the	macro	 level	 from	 the	micro-level	 activities	 and	
interactions	of	people	in	a	very	wide	variety	of	individual	social	situations.		
	
Most	systems	administered	by	politicians	cannot	be	predicted	in	a	conventional	scientific	sense.	
Prediction	 is	 the	gold	standard	of	conventional	science.	Theories	 live	or	die	by	their	ability	 to	
predict	events	in	the	future	and	by	experiments	showing	the	predictions	are	correct.	Generally	
these	are	point	predictions	that	a	particular	event	will	occur	at	a	particular	point	in	time.	Such	
predictions	are	rarely	possible	in	complex	systems.	There	are	many	interrelated	reasons	for	this	
but	 together	 they	 make	 the	 dynamics	 of	 complex	 multilevel	 systems	 “sensitive	 to	 initial	
conditions.”	 Change	 the	 starting	 position	 slightly	 at	 any	 level	 and	 the	 outcome	 can	 be	 very	
different.	For	example,	 in	 the	U.K.	 the	apparently	minor	decision	not	 to	maintain	a	complete	
stock	 of	 protective	 personal	 equipment	 (PPE)	 in	 2009	 contributed	 greatly	 to	 the	 inability	 to	
protect	frontline	medical	and	service	staff	in	2020	[8].	Complex	systems	cannot	be	predicted	in	
a	deterministic	sense.	At	best	future	events	can	be	identified	and	approximate	estimates	made	
of	their	likelihood.	Apart	from	guesswork	and	blind	certainty,	the	only	scientific	way	to	forecast	
possible	behaviors	of	complex	systems	is	mathematical,	statistical,	and	computer	modeling	and	
computer	simulation	building	on	conventional	scientific	knowledge.	
	
	
Models	and	Computation	
	
A	model	is	a	description	of	a	system	or	process	to	show	how	it	works.	We	have	mental	models	
about	all	aspects	of	our	lives	and	we	use	them	to	try	to	understand	things	and	decide	what	to	
do.	The	idea	of	a	scientific	model	is	that	the	“real	world”	is	mapped	to	an	abstraction	in	words,	
numbers,	pictures,	etc.	Within	 that	abstraction	there	are	transition	rules	 that	map	the	model	
from	 its	 state	 “now”	 to	 another	 state	 in	 future	 time	 (Figure	 1).	 In	 traditional	 science	 if	 the	
modeled	dynamics	and	the	real	dynamics	give	the	same	outcome,	the	modeled	dynamics	are	
accepted	as	 a	 viable	 theory	of	 the	actual	 dynamics.	 This	 validation	has	 to	be	 repeated	many	
times	for	people	to	trust	it.	
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Figure	1.	A	simplified	view	of	modeling.	
	
Typically	modeling	proceeds	 in	two	stages:	 (i)	The	model	 is	compared	with	reality	to	see	how	
well	 it	 predicts	 outcomes	 when	 the	 only	 information	 provided	 is	 parameter	 measurements	
from	 the	 actual	 world.	 Then	 (ii)	 forecasting	 is	 done	with	 a	 validated	model	 where	 the	main	
uncertainty	is	the	values	of	the	parameters	in	the	future	time	period.	The	modeler	has	to	make	
assumptions	about	those	 future	parameter	values,	which	then	go	 into	the	model	 to	yield	the	
forecast.	Most	science	aims	to	work	with	validated	models	and	validated	methods	of	parameter	
forecasting,	and	the	best	science	makes	clear	the	underlying	assumptions.	
	
With	complex	systems	the	modeled	dynamics	are	not	expected	to	produce	point	predictions.	In	
fact	 the	 science	 of	 complex	 systems	 allows—or	 expects—the	modeled	 dynamics	 to	 produce	
different	 forecasts	 of	 future	modeled	 states.	 A	 further	 complication	 is	 that	 complex	 systems	
may	undergo	local	or	global	phase	transitions	so	assumptions	that	are	valid	at	one	time	become	
invalid	at	another	[9].	Indeed	one	of	the	defining	features	of	complex	adaptive	systems	is	that	
they	can	reconfigure	themselves	and	behave	in	new	and	different	ways	[10].	
	
Complex	systems	science	is	computer	enabled	and	one	of	its	most	powerful	tools	is	simulation	
by	iterated	computation.	This	involves	computing	the	system	state	at	the	next	tick	of	the	clock	
from	its	current	state	using	transition	rules.	For	systems	that	are	sensitive	to	initial	conditions	
this	 kind	 of	 computer	 modeling	 involves	 running	 simulation	 programs	 many	 thousands	 or	
millions	of	times	to	produce	distributions	of	outcomes.	This	gives	a	view	of	the	space	of	future	
events	 rather	 than	 saying	 that	 any	 particular	 event	 will	 occur.	 A	 single	 run	 of	 a	 computer	
simulation	 tells	 you	 almost	 nothing.	Many	 runs	 from	many	 starting	 positions	 are	 needed	 to	
populate	 the	 space	 of	 future	 possibilities	 so	 that	 its	 shape	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	 alternative	
events	can	be	evaluated.	For	these	reasons	real-world	computer	modeling	often	requires	large	
powerful	computational	infrastructure.	Nonetheless	useful	computer	modeling	can	be	done	on	
standard	PCs	and	notebook	computers.	Also	modeling	embraces	AI,	IoT,	and	social	media,	e.g.,	
the	new	apps	being	developed	using	mobile	telephony	to	collect	contact	information	to	support	
the	test-trace-isolate	policies	used	to	try	to	contain	the	pandemic	at	local	levels.	
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Macro-level	Epidemic	Models	
	
A	key	parameter	for	epidemics	is	the	basic	reproduction	number,	R0,	which	is	defined	to	be	the	
number	of	people	an	infected	person	will	infect	at	the	beginning	of	an	epidemic.	This	depends	
on	many	things,	some	biological	and	some	cultural,	such	as	shaking	hands,	kissing,	hugging,	and	
close	 contact	 at	 shared	 meals,	 parties,	 and	 musical	 events.	 As	 an	 epidemic	 develops	 the	
reproduction	 number,	 R,	 may	 change	 according	 to	 the	 number	 of	 susceptible	 people,	 local	
circumstances,	and	policy	interventions.	
	
In	1927	Kermack	and	McKendrick	proposed	one	of	 the	 first	models	of	epidemics	 [11].	 It	was	
called	the	SIR	model	and	could	be	used	to	investigate	the	relationships	between	the	numbers	of	
susceptible	(S),	infected	(I),	and	recovered	(R)	people	in	a	population.	Interest	in	the	SIR	model	
was	rekindled	by	a	paper	by	Anderson	and	May	 in	1992	 [12].	The	model’s	abstraction	 is	 that	
there	is	a	population	made	up	of	susceptible	people,	infected	people,	and	recovered	people.	In	
the	basic	SIR	model	it	is	assumed	that	when	people	have	recovered	they	are	not	susceptible	to	
reinfection.	In	the	SIR	model	the	reproduction	number	R	is	defined	as	the	infection	rate	divided	
by	 the	 recovery	 rate.	When	 the	 infection	 rate	 is	 greater	 than	 the	 recovery	 rate	 (R	 >	 1.0)	 an	
epidemic	 can	 occur.	When	 the	 recovery	 rate	 is	 greater	 than	 the	 infection	 rate	 (R	 <	 1.0)	 the	
epidemic	 dies	 out.	 This	model	 is	 based	 on	 differential	 equations	 that	 link	 the	 increases	 and	
decreases	 in	 the	 numbers	 of	 susceptible	 people	 (blue	 curve),	 infected	 (red),	 and	 recovered	
(green)	as	shown	in	Figure	2.	
	
The	basic	SIR	model	 (https://cs-dc.uk/sir.html)	 is	easy	 to	program	and	gives	 results	 similar	 to	
those	in	Figure	2(a).	The	red	curve	shows	the	proportion	of	the	population	infected	at	any	time.	
The	worry	for	policy	makers	is	that	the	peak	of	this	red	curve	for	infected	people	may	swamp	
the	available	healthcare	provision,	as	was	seen	in	Italy	in	March	2020	[4].	
	
							 	
(a)	The	SIR	model																																																											 (b)	The	cumulative	distribution	S	curve	fits	the	SIR	model	
Figure	2.	An	example	of	the	SIR	model.		
	
Although	the	SIR	model	gives	a	good	understanding	of	the	shape	of	epidemics	and	explains	why	
vaccination	 works	 (the	 number	 of	 susceptible	 people	 in	 a	 population	 decreases	 so	 that	 the	
susceptible recovered 
infected 
recovered 
cumulative 
distribution 
function 
 
Ubiquity,	an	ACM	publication	
	 October	2020	
	 	
	 	
http://ubiquity.acm.org	 7	 ©2020	Association	for	Computing	Machinery	
infection	 cannot	 reach	 exponential	 growth)	 it	 has	 limited	 value	 for	 forecasting	 because	
externally	induced	changes	are	likely.	For	example,	it	cannot	support	an	analysis	of	the	WHO’s	
test-trace-isolate	 policy	 which,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 vaccine,	 is	 seen	 by	 many	 as	 the	 way	 to	
control	a	pandemic.	
	
Figure	 2(b)	 shows	 the	 black	 S	 curve	 of	 the	 cumulative	 distribution	 function	
𝑓 𝑥 =  1 (1+ 𝑒!(!!!)/!) is	a	good	fit	 to	 the	green	curve	of	 recovered	people	generated	by	
the	Kermack-McKendrick	model.	Related	S	curves	occur	in	other	well-known	applications	such	
as	 the	Bass	Diffusion	model	 [13],	 a	differential	 equation	 for	 the	 S-curve,	which	 is	 a	universal	
feature	of	adoption	and	spread	of	technology	in	populations.	The	Bass	model	can	forecast	the	
total	number	of	adoptions	and	the	inflection	point	of	the	S-curve.	Using	calibrated	curves,	such	
as	the	S-curve	models,	works	well	in	diffusion	models	when	there	is	no	change	in	the	underlying	
dynamics.	 Social	 distancing	 or	 lockdowns	 changes	 the	 underlying	 dynamics	 and	makes	 these	
models	inappropriate	for	forecasting.	
	
Figure	3.	The	phases	of	the	empirical	curves	do	not	fit	the	S	model.	
	
Two	major	problems	make	 forecasting	epidemics	difficult:	 changes	 in	 social	behavior	altering	
the	underlying	dynamics	and	the	availability	of	reliable	data.	
	
The	first	is	illustrated	by	the	different	shaped	curved	in	Figure	3.	On	June	30th	India	was	still	in	
the	exponential	phase	of	 the	S	curve.	However	after	March	28th	the	USA	no	 longer	had	an	S	
curve	but	had	an	almost	linear	trajectory.	In	contrast	the	number	of	new	infections	in	the	U.K.	
tails	off	in	June	while	in	Italy	the	total	number	of	people	newly	infected	tails	off	towards	zero.	
The	reason	these	curves	deviate	from	the	S	curve	is	that	policy	and	changes	in	public	behavior	
have	changed	the	reproduction	number.	Although	policy	makers	hope	their	policies	will	work—
and	 these	 curves	 give	 retrospective	 evidence	 that	 some	 policies	 have	worked—modeling	 by	
curve	fitting	has	limited	value	for	forecasting	when	there	is	no	way	of	knowing	when	one	kind	
of	 curve	 will	 transform	 into	 another.	 For	 example,	 in	 September	 2020	many	 countries	 have	
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experienced	 new	 exponential	 growth	 and	 are	 now	 preparing	 for	 a	 “second	 wave”	 not	
evidenced	in	the	graphs	of	Figure	3.	
	
The	second	problem	with	these	models	is	that	the	data	in	many	countries	can	be	very	poor.	For	
example	 in	 the	 U.K.	 there	 is	 systemic	 underreporting	 at	 weekends	 as	 new	 cases	 wait	 to	 be	
added	 to	 the	 statistics	 for	 Monday	 or	 Tuesday.	 Worse	 is	 that	 infections	 may	 be	 missed	 or	
misclassified.	 Even	 worse	 is	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 comprehensive	 testing	 we	 do	 not	 know	 how	
many	people	have	had	the	virus,	how	many	people	are	asymptomatic,	and	how	many	people	
are	 naturally	 immune.	 Thus	 the	 proportion	 of	 susceptible	 people	 in	 the	 population	 may	 be	
much	 lower	 than	 100	percent	with	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	model.	 Even	 the	 best	models	
cannot	give	meaningful	forecasts	in	the	absence	of	reliable	data.	
	
In	epidemiology	with	a	new	disease,	such	as	COVID-19,	there	is	no	way	to	validate	the	model.	
The	 best	 that	 can	 be	 done	 is	 taking	models	 from	 similar	 past	 diseases	 and	modifying	 them	
according	 to	 your	 assumptions	 for	 future	 parameters.	 This	 is	 much	 more	 challenging	 than	
standard	scientific	modeling	because	the	model	and	the	parameter	forecast	methods	cannot	be	
validated	beforehand.	
	
Parameter	forecasting	for	the	Kermack-McKendrick	model	is	a	particular	difficulty.	For	example	
initial	estimates	of	the	initial	reproduction	for	COVID-19,	R0,	were	in	the	range	1.9	to	5.7	[14].	
This	makes	a	huge	difference	to	the	simulated	evolution	of	an	epidemic.	
	
	
Agent-Based	Modeling	
	
One	 of	 the	 major	 tools	 of	 complex	 systems	 science	 is	 agent	 based	 modeling	 for	 computer	
simulation.	 Instead	 of	 trying	 to	 model	 macro-level	 statistics	 such	 as	 the	 number	 of	 people	
infected	in	a	nation,	in	this	approach	these	numbers	emerge	from	the	micro-level	interactions	
of	 simulated	 agents	 (people	 in	 this	 case).	 In	 the	 simplest	 cases	 people	 are	 represented	 by	
colored	 dots	 on	 a	 computer	 screen:	 red	 for	 infected,	 blue	 for	 susceptible,	 and	 grey	 for	
recovered.	The	dots	move	around	the	screen	and	when	a	red	infected	dot	gets	close	to	a	blue	
uninfected	 susceptible	 dot,	with	 a	 given	 probability	 the	 susceptible	 agent	 becomes	 infected.	
This	is	illustrated	by	the	sequence	in	Figure	4.	At	the	beginning	(top	left)	no	agents	are	infected,	
at	the	top	right	the	infection	is	in	the	exponential	phase,	at	the	bottom	left	the	red	peak	of	the	
infection	has	been	passed,	and	at	the	bottom	right	the	epidemic	is	almost	over.	
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Figure	4.	An	agent-based	simulation	of	an	epidemic.	
	
A	model	 like	this	 is	makes	 it	easy	to	understand	the	epidemic	process	and	the	lay	person	can	
see	the	exponential	growth	of	the	epidemic	and	how	epidemics	can	jump	from	one	country	to	
another.	However,	although	these	animations	can	be	alluring	they	depend	on	the	assumptions	
built	into	the	simulation.	Lay	people	may	be	willing	to	trust	that	the	modelers’	assumptions	are	
reasonable,	 but	 they	 have	 no	 way	 check.	 Modelers	 do	 not	 always	 present	 the	 results	 of	
sensitivity	analyses	(small	changes	in	modeling	assumptions),	making	it	harder	for	lay	people	to	
be	skeptical	and	question	a	model’s	output.		
	
In	the	absence	of	a	vaccine,	as	lockdown	is	eased	the	number	of	susceptible	people	will	remain	
high	(although	without	adequate	testing	exactly	how	many	cannot	be	known).	This	means	there	
could	be	sufficient	susceptible	people	in	the	population	for	the	epidemic	to	re-emerge,	possibly	
requiring	another	even	more	socially	and	economically	damaging	lockdown.	In	many	countries	
the	 epidemic	 is	 being	 controlled	 by	 the	 well-established	 test-trace-isolate	 procedures	 of	
epidemiologists.	 Computer	 modeling	 has	 enabled	 this	 policy	 to	 be	 tested	 in	 silico	 and	 the	
results	 suggest	 it	 will	 be	 very	 successful—as	 it	 has	 been	 in	 the	 countries	 than	 have	
implemented	 it.	 However	 some	 countries	 do	 not	 have	 effective	 testing	 and	 this	 makes	
controlling	the	epidemic	more	difficult.	
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Are	the	Models	Wrong	and	Dangerous?		
	
Here	 is	where	the	controversies	exist.	A	modeler	might	say	the	parameters	are	based	on	real	
data	 (evidence	 based)	 but	 that	 does	 not	 overcome	 questionable	 assumptions.	 Some	 policy	
makers	are	challenging	the	models	because	they	are	not	sure	the	right	“evidence”	is	being	used	
or	the	assumptions	are	right.	Other	policy	makers	are	making	value	judgments	about	tradeoffs	
between	what	the	models	say	and	the	social	and	economic	costs.		
	
Alex	Berenson	gives	a	scathing	account	of	the	Imperial	College	model	that	led	to	the	lockdown	
policy	in	the	U.K.	and	the	University	of	Washington	Model	that	has	informed	policy	makers	in	
the	USA.	 In	 his	 view	 these	models	 are	 indeed	wrong	 and	 dangerous	 [15].	 Sharon	 Begly	 also	
criticizes	the	Washington	University	model,	which	she	says	is	flawed	and	should	not	be	used	to	
guide	U.S.	policies	[16].	Certainly	some	models	proposed	by	scientists	are	contradicted	by	the	
available	evidence,	and	some	arguments	made	by	scientists	are	flawed	logically,	empirically,	or	
both.	 Modern	 science	 can	 be	 big	 business	 and	 human	 weaknesses	 can	 overcome	 scientific	
integrity.	Consulting	for	the	government	can	fund	laboratories	and	make	successful	careers,	but	
it	can	also	compromise	objectivity.	
	
	
Computational	Modeling	and	Future	COVID-19	Policies	
	
Democracy	 has	 been	 described	 as	 the	 least	 worst	 form	 of	 government.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	
computational	modeling	could	be	described	as	the	least	worst	way	of	anticipating	the	future	for	
policy	purposes.	
	
At	 the	 time	 of	 this	 writing	 (September	 2020)	 citizens	 and	 business	 in	 many	 countries	 are	
desperate	 to	 end	 lockdown	 and	 governments	 are	 responding.	 In	 the	 U.K.	 the	 2-meter	
separation	guidance	has	been	replaced	by	a	1-meter	rule	suggesting	that	political	pressure	may	
override	 evidence-based	 modeling.	 It	 appears	 politicians	 are	 diverging	 from	 their	 scientific	
advisors	and	making	decisions	to	relax	the	 lockdown	on	political	as	well	as	scientific	grounds.	
However	some	question	whether	England	began	ending	 its	 lockdown	 in	 July	 too	soon	 [17].	 It	
remains	to	be	seen	if	the	risks	taken	for	political	reasons	pay	off,	or	if	they	release	new	waves	
of	 infection	 in	 the	 great	 majority	 of	 the	 U.K.	 population	 believed	 to	 be	 uninfected	 and	
susceptible.	 The	 stakes	 are	 high.	 In	 August	 2020	 the	 USA	 and	 the	 U.K	 saw	 new	 epidemic	
hotspots	 emerge	 and	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 pandemic	 is	 not	 close	 to	 being	 over,	 as	 the	World	
Health	Organization	warns.	In	September	2020	the	British	Prime	Minister	said	the	U.K.	is	"now	
seeing	a	second	wave"	of	COVID-19	and	that	"It's	been	 inevitable	we'd	see	 it	 in	 this	country"	
[18].	
	
There	 are	 many	 subtle	 patterns	 of	 infection	 dynamics	 that	 could	 still	 occur,	 including	
transmission	on	“star	networks”	as	local	towns	and	cities	become	infected.	How	can	we	know	
whether	or	not	this	will	happen?	Without	modeling	we	go	into	the	unknown.	With	modeling—
assuming	transparency	about	its	methods,	data,	and	assumptions—we	have	a	vision	of	possible	
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futures	 that	 can	 help	 us	 take	 the	 safest	 paths	 with	 the	 least	 risk	 and	 best	 chance	 of	 good	
outcomes.	
	
Managing	the	pandemic	on	the	ground	is	very	complicated.	Although	we	have	good	models	of	
how	 COVID-19	 is	 spread	 the	 number	 of	 variations	 for	 any	 particular	 case	 can	 be	 large.	 For	
example,	consider	children	returning	to	school.	The	interactions	between	children	can	be	very	
varied	as	they	move	through	corridors	between	classrooms,	interact	in	class,	and	travel	to	and	
from	school.	Even	though	most	schools	have	their	own	individual	layouts	it	would	be	possible	
to	build	computer	models	and	simulate	movements	and	infections	starting	from	many	sets	of	
initial	conditions.	Similarly,	simulations	of	movements	and	interactions	could	reassure	workers	
that	it	is	safe	to	go	back	to	their	city	center	office	or	inform	managers	that	further	measures	are	
required	 to	make	 the	workplace	 safe.	 Such	models	 let	us	 run	 “what	 if”	 scenarios	 that	 reveal	
possible	 futures	 based	 on	 a	 given	 set	 of	 assumptions.	 Policy	 makers	 have	 to	 decide	 which	
scenarios	to	take	more	seriously	and	 implement	policies	that	will	maximize	the	chance	of	the	
desired	future	actually	occurring.	The	use	of	models	to	run	scenarios	is	not	the	same	as	running	
them	to	make	predictions.	
	
	
Political	Leadership	
	
In	the	end	good	policies	result	from	good	leadership.	The	leaders	decide	what	to	do	and	use	the	
models	for	advice.	This	is	what	Winston	Churchill	was	driving	at	when	he	said,	“scientists	should	
be	on	tap,	not	on	top.”	
	
When	 the	 pandemic	 unfolded	 many	 leaders	 were	 criticized	 for	 lack	 of	 preparedness.	 But	
governments	 find	 it	 constitutionally	 challenging	 to	 spend	 resources	 on	 possible	 events	 that	
seem	remote	and	unlikely—there	are	so	many	urgent	 things	 to	do	 in	 the	present.	The	public	
will	support	attending	to	the	urgent	but	not	preparing	for	the	rainy	day.	Some	scientists	were	
warning	 that	 pandemic	 danger	 was	 getting	 high	 because	 of	 international	 travel	 and	 the	
increasing	 number	 of	 labs	 experimenting	 with	 genetically	 modified	 viruses.	 For	 example,	 in	
2015	Bill	Gates	gave	a	TED	talk	warning	of	an	imminent	pandemic	[19].	But	such	warnings	could	
gather	no	following	and	few	governments	were	prepared.	The	ones	that	did	the	best	(Taiwan	
and	South	Korea)	had	already	had	previous	close	brushes	with	the	SARS	coronavirus	and	took	
steps	 to	 be	 prepared	 for	 another	 surge.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 governments	 now	 have	 the	 public	
support	 they	 need	 to	 prepare	 for	 future	 pandemics.	 This	 preparation	 can	 be	 informed	 by	
computer	modeling.	
	
	
Summary	
	
Computational	modeling	 is	 an	 essential	 input	 to	 policy	 for	managing	major	 disruptive	 events	
such	 as	 the	 COVID-19	 pandemic.	 Two	major	 approaches	 to	 modeling	 have	 been	 presented:	
curve	fitting	to	macro-level	models	based	on	differential	equations	and	agent-based	modeling	
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based	 on	 interactions	 at	 the	 micro	 level.	 The	 former	 are	 aggregate	 macro-level	 numerical	
models	 while	 the	 latter	 disaggregate	 micro-level	 models	 based	 on	 hypotheses	 of	 agent	
behavior	within	their	environment.	While	politicians	like	very	much	the	simplicity	of	R	to	make	
policy	arguments,	experts	warn	about	 important	weaknesses	of	 calculating/estimating	of	 this	
number	at	the	country	and	regional	level	[20].		
	
Macro-level	models	are	useful	for	providing	forecasts	of	future	numbers.	Agent-based	models	
go	 further	 because	 they	 give	 insights	 into	 the	 space	 of	 future	 possibilities.	 The	 macro-level	
models	 are	 susceptible	 to	 error	 due	 to	 externally	 induced	 phase	 change—for	 example,	
lockdown	completely	changes	the	shapes	of	the	curves.	Agent-based	models	can	model	phase	
changes	 yielding	 a	 better	 insights	 into	 the	 possible	 future.	 All	 these	 models	 can	 give	 poor	
results,	especially	when	the	data	are	poor.		
	
There	is	an	inevitable	tension	between	politicians	and	scientists	since	the	former	want	simple	
single	answers	to	their	questions,	while	the	latter	present	many	alternatives	reflecting	the	way	
that	 science	works.	 Science	does	not	present	a	 single	 view	but	has	many	 competing	ways	 to	
model	 new	 phenomena.	 The	 argument	 “we	 follow	 the	 science”	 is	 undermined	 when	 the	
scientists	can’t	agree	among	themselves.	
	
We	believe	computational	models	are	the	best	we	have	to	guide	policy.	Since	models	can	give	
bad	 forecasts,	modelers	 should	make	 their	 assumption	 clear	 (including	 data	 assumptions)	 so	
that	others	can	decide.	Ultimately	policy	makers	must	make	decisions,	including	which	models	
to	accept	or	reject	within	a	wider	political	context.	Furthermore,	policy	decisions	must	take	into	
consideration	a	delicate	trade	off	between	public	health	and	the	economic	and	social	damage	
of	pandemic	catastrophe	leading	to	deep	recession	and	social	unrest.		
	
Computational	modeling	will	 be	 important	 in	 the	 recovery	 from	 the	pandemic	 over	 the	 next	
few	years	for	meta	modeling	pandemics	waves,	economic	impact,	and	social	change.	These	are	
highly	intertwined	and	immensely	complex	problems.	They	are	singular,	history-making	events	
deserving	 better	 attention	 and	 the	 deeper	 understanding	 that	 computational	 modeling	 can	
provide.	
	
	
Further	information	
More	detail	can	be	found	in	the	free	online	course	‘COVID-19:	Pandemics,	Modelling,	and	Policy	
produced	by	the	UNESCO	UniTwin	Complex	Systems	Digital	Campus.		
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